Frequently asked

Straight answers.

Including the hard questions, the ones reviewers and security researchers ask. Where something isn't proven or isn't finished, we say so.

The project

What is Favilla KEY, in one sentence?

A personal security device: a small machined hardware key that holds the secrets you can't afford to lose (your Nostr identity, your bitcoin, and in time your logins) on chips built only for that, and asks for your PIN and your press before it uses them.

Is this a real product or a concept page?

A real, working device. The KEYs on our bench sign real Nostr events and real Bitcoin transactions on mainnet every day. It is not on sale yet. Radio certification is done. A first batch of developer units goes out first, labelled as engineering samples, and the early-access list takes no money: no deposits, no pre-orders, just an email.

Favilla KEY is built by Favilla Pty Ltd, an Australian company founded by Joshua Coverley. You can look the company up on the Australian Business Register.

When can I buy one, and what does it cost?

Pricing will be announced before anything goes on sale, and the first production run will be small. The early-access list hears first and gets first allocation, and joining costs nothing.

Which features are in the units, and which are still being built?

In the dev-unit firmware: the Nostr signer and phone app, remote signing (NIP-46), encrypted messages, the air-gapped Bitcoin wallet, multisig cosigning, BIP-39 passphrases, dice or two-chip seed generation, anti-exfil signing, the door latch and device attestation.

In testing, with first versions on the developer units: passkeys (including discoverable ones), the Favilla Vault for passwords and 2FA codes, Emberwill inheritance, and Bluetooth with the Favilla iPhone app.

Planned: an owner flashing tool and signing rules you write yourself.

Should I trust this with serious value today?

Don't trust. Verify. The firmware and the app will be published as open source, and an independent audit is under way. Until both are done, treat the KEY as unaudited, as we do. For Bitcoin, our standing advice is multisig, so the KEY never spends alone.

What's on the table today is working hardware, a documented architecture, and precise claims about where every key lives, each written to be checked against the code.

Security model

Where do my keys actually live?

Your Nostr key and your Bitcoin seed are stored as AES-256 ciphertext, wrapped twice. The outer layer can only be opened inside the NXP SE051 secure element, the inner layer only inside the vault processor, a separate STM32G0 with no radio. The wrapped Nostr key is kept inside the secure element; the wrapped seed is kept in a write-once page on the vault processor. Both are opened and used only on the vault processor. The main chip, the one with Wi-Fi, holds nothing secret in plain form in its flash.

Each door has its own PIN, checked inside the secure element. Wrong tries bring growing delays, up to a day. After nine wrong tries the KEY stops and offers a wipe, and you restore from your recovery words. From a paired phone you get three tries at the Nostr PIN, then remote unlock is refused until you unlock on the KEY. Full architecture here.

Does the secure element sign Nostr events itself?

No, and we're precise about this where others blur it. The SE051 has no BIP-340 Schnorr signing, and no commercially available secure element we know of does. So the signature is computed on the vault processor: a deliberately simple chip with no radio and no network stack that accepts a 32-byte hash in a fixed-length command and returns a signature. It has no command that returns a key. The Wi-Fi chip never holds it; a remote compromise of the connected side finds nothing to steal.

The honest residual is that whoever controls the connected chip can ask the vault to sign, within your signing mode, for as long as they hold that access, and a physical power cycle removes them. The same applies to Bitcoin keys, which are also only used on the vault processor.

Could the signing chip leak my key without anyone noticing?

Not any more. A signature's nonce is mathematically tied to the key, so a dishonest signing chip could hide key bits in the nonces it picks. Every Nostr and Bitcoin signature on the KEY now uses a nonce the vault processor cannot choose alone, and the main chip checks it before the signature is released. If the check fails, the KEY shows SIGNER FAULT and stops signing until the next power cycle. We built a deliberately dishonest vault firmware to prove the check catches it: the test report.

Isn't Wi-Fi a huge attack surface for a signing device?

A connected device has a wider surface than an offline-only one. That's physics, not spin. Our answer is to keep the surface in its own door:

The Bitcoin door is offline. The Wi-Fi driver is never started in it, the firmware checks every two seconds that it hasn't been, and moving funds happens only across the camera and the screen.

The Nostr door is online, and even there the things that matter stay out of reach: your keys are used only on a processor the Wi-Fi chip cannot read, browser sessions are paired and encrypted, and unpaired requests are rejected. A compromised network can annoy you. It can't approve a Bitcoin transaction, and it can't take your key.

What stops another device on my network from talking to my KEY?

Pairing, and the secret part of it doesn't happen over the network. Your phone shows a QR, the KEY scans it with its camera, and both screens then show a six-digit code computed from the new session key. Pairing completes only when you confirm the match on the KEY. Anyone interfering ends up with codes that don't match.

After that, every sensitive request is individually encrypted and authenticated, with replay protection. Unpaired requests are rejected. The only thing a paired session can unlock is the Nostr door, with three tries. Bitcoin signing, PIN changes, showing your words and wiping the device exist only on the KEY's own buttons. Even a fully compromised computer can only ask.

What if someone grabs the KEY while it's unlocked?

By default it locks itself by going to sleep after five minutes idle, and sleep wipes the working keys. If you want more, turn on the motion lock in Settings: once it has been still for a while, picking it up wipes the working keys and asks for the PIN again. It is off by default.

Honest limits: that protects against a snatch-and-run. It is not a defence against a skilled attacker with time and equipment, and there is no tamper switch in the enclosure. Secure Boot, the vault processor and the SE051 are what stand in that attacker's way.

Is there a duress PIN or a decoy wallet?

No duress PIN. A BIP-39 passphrase can give you a second wallet from the same words, and any passphrase, or none, opens a different wallet, so the words alone don't prove which one is real. There's also a cover mode that boots straight into the CIPHER game, but it is camouflage, not duress protection.

What does the screen show before a Bitcoin transaction is signed?

Destination address, amount and fee, on the KEY's own screen, before you approve. No browser, extension or malware can draw over it. Approval is the KEY's buttons plus the BTC PIN. If what's on the screen isn't what you meant, decline and nothing is signed. For a multisig wallet, the KEY signs only against the descriptor you registered on it.

Does every Nostr event wait for me to press a button?

In Manual mode, the default, yes, except relay log-in challenges, which are answered automatically. Selective signs everyday events (notes, reactions, reposts, zap requests, relay lists, message seals) on its own and asks for the rest. Auto signs everything, for people who leave the KEY at home as their always-on signer. The mode is set on the KEY and no app can change it. Bitcoin is always manual.

Isn't packing a wallet, a signer, messaging, a web server and a game into one device asking for trouble?

Complexity is a real cost and we won't pretend otherwise. What keeps it honest:

The doors. Bitcoin never shares a power-on with the network, the app, messaging or the game. They live in the Nostr door; Bitcoin lives behind its own PIN after a real power cycle.

The keys aren't where the complexity is. The web server, the app and the game run on the main chip. Your keys are used on the vault processor, which runs a small fixed command set and nothing else.

Nobody else's apps. The KEY runs one firmware from us, signed, with no app store and no plugins. It is built on well-known open-source libraries, like bitcoin-core's secp256k1, which ship with their licences in the source.

Passkeys & inheritance

Can I use the KEY as a passkey or security key for websites?

It's in the firmware and being tested now. Over USB or Bluetooth the KEY acts as a FIDO2 security key: sites register a passkey on it and ask it to sign you in, with the site's name on the KEY's screen and a button press each time.

You'll be able to choose between passkeys tied to that one KEY (made inside the secure element, gone if the KEY is lost) and restorable passkeys that come back from your recovery words on a replacement KEY. Discoverable passkeys, the kind that sign you in without typing a username, work too. FIDO certification is not done yet. More detail.

Will it store my passwords?

Yes. The Favilla Vault is in the firmware and being tested now. It keeps ordinary usernames, passwords and 2FA codes sealed on the KEY, in its own Vault door with its own PIN. The KEY types a login in for you as a USB or Bluetooth keyboard, or hands it to the Favilla iPhone app for AutoFill, so your passwords are not kept on your computer or phone. 2FA codes are computed inside the vault processor; the secret never leaves it. The KEY can also flag weak, reused and breached passwords without ever sending a password anywhere. Backups are encrypted so your recovery words can restore them.

What is Emberwill?

Inheritance for your bitcoin, built into the KEY. You choose who gets your coins and how long a silence should be. While you keep using the KEY, nothing happens. If you go quiet for that long, the KEY gives a warning period that any unlock cancels, and then pays the people you named. It has run on mainnet with real coins on our bench, and a first version goes on the developer units. It is still being tested and finished. Emberwill in plain words.

Recovery & backup

Where does the randomness for my seed come from, and can I check it?

You choose, at setup. Two chips draws one 16×16 grid from the SE051's true random number generator and another from the camera sensor, shows you both, and XORs them into the value it hashes, so a flaw or a backdoor in either chip would have to beat the other one too. You can redo that arithmetic yourself in the seed verifier. Dice lets you roll a standard d6, 50 or 99 times; the KEY derives your seed from a published function of those rolls, with nothing from the device mixed in.

The dice option exists so you don't have to take our word for anything. Because the construction is public and takes nothing from the device, you can run it yourself on an offline machine (printf '3141...' | sha256sum) and confirm the words the KEY showed you are the ones your rolls dictate.

One honest note on the two-chip path: it protects you from a bad chip, but not from bad firmware on the main processor, which assembles the result. Only dice removes that trust too.

Could the same thing that happened to Coldcard happen here?

The shape of that failure is possible on any device, including ours. Coldcard's firmware quietly used a software generator instead of its hardware chip for years. The output looked perfect, every test passed, and nobody could tell from outside.

What we've done about it: seed generation fails closed. If the camera layer falls below its pass line, or both layers come back flat, the KEY stops and shows an error rather than substituting something weaker. The seed comes from two independent chips XORed together and both grids are shown to you, so a silently replaced source would have to happen in two places at once and still show you plausible grids. The main processor's own generator is never used for your seed.

None of that is proof. Only the dice path is, and that's why it's there.

If I lose the KEY, do I lose my bitcoin and my Nostr identity?

No. One set of recovery words restores both. At setup the KEY makes a standard BIP-39 phrase (12 or 24 words). Your Nostr identity derives from it via NIP-06 and your Bitcoin wallet via BIP-84, so the words you write down once recover everything on a replacement KEY. Your bitcoin also restores into any standard BIP-39 wallet, hardware or software. You're never locked in.

Keep these with the words. If you use a BIP-39 passphrase, the words plus the passphrase are the backup, and the fingerprint the KEY shows tells you which wallet you're in. If you use the KEY in a multisig, keep the wallet descriptor too (the KEY exports it as a QR). Passkeys tied to one KEY are not restorable by design; restorable ones are.

You can also bring an existing Nostr identity: importing an nsec is supported, and the KEY then runs as a Nostr-only signer, since an nsec carries no Bitcoin seed.

Can I export my Nostr key back out of the KEY?

Your recovery words are the export. Your Nostr key derives from them (NIP-06), so the words in your possession make your identity portable to anything that speaks the standard. What the KEY never does is hand a key to a connected computer. There is no nsec export; only signatures leave.

Openness & verification

Where's the source code?

The firmware and the app will be published as open source. Because the app is served from the firmware, checking the firmware checks the app too. The aim is reproducible builds, so you can compile the source and compare the result with what your KEY runs; that isn't in place yet.

Until the source is public and independently reviewed, treat the KEY as unaudited. We do.

Has it been independently audited?

An independent audit of the device and firmware is under way. It isn't finished, and we'll publish what it finds. A vulnerability disclosure policy with a security contact comes with the public source. We'd rather ship later with those in place than sooner without them.

Are Secure Boot and debug locks enabled? What about flash encryption?

Secure Boot V2 is on the KEYs we build: burned into one-time eFuses, checked by the boot ROM on every boot, and only firmware signed on our offline provisioning station will run. JTAG and the ROM download mode are locked down. A USB cable doesn't let anyone load their own firmware onto a factory-signed KEY.

The vault processor's readout lock is not set yet. It's set at the factory once the vault firmware has passed the audit, and from then on its debug port is permanently closed. Until then, someone who opens a KEY and attaches a debugger to the vault processor could read it; the secure element's layer still stands between that and your keys.

Flash encryption on the main processor isn't used, because that flash holds no keys. It may come later as an owner's option.

How do firmware updates work?

There are no over-the-air updates, on purpose: there's no code on the KEY that fetches firmware from the internet, so we can never be made to push a quiet update to one person. Updates are signed images you choose to flash over USB, and Secure Boot refuses anything we didn't sign. An owner flashing tool and published release hashes are planned.

How do I know my KEY is genuine?

Open favillakey.io/verify on your phone. It shows a fresh challenge as a QR; the KEY signs it with a key made inside its secure element at the factory and shows its reply; your phone checks that against our published list. Nothing is sent to us.

Nostr, Bitcoin & compatibility

Is Favilla KEY a Bitcoin hardware wallet?

It does the job of one for signing: your seed is made on the device, stored sealed, and every transaction is checked and approved on the KEY's own screen, offline, over QR codes. Strictly, though, your wallet is your recovery words, not the device. The KEY is the signer that keeps them away from your computer and phone.

We recommend using it in a multisig wallet alongside a signing device from another maker, so no single device or vendor, ours included, can spend on its own. Sparrow and BlueWallet are the coordinators we test with.

What is a Nostr signer, or a NIP-46 bunker?

On Nostr your account is a private key (your nsec). Every post, like and message is signed with it, and whoever has it is you. Most people paste it into apps and browser extensions, where any one of them can leak it.

A signer keeps the key in one place and signs for the apps instead. A NIP-46 bunker does that over Nostr relays: Amethyst, Coracle or any app that supports Nostr Connect sends a signing request, and the KEY signs it or asks you first. The app never sees your key. Favilla KEY is a hardware bunker, so the key lives on a chip with no radio rather than in an app. How to keep your Nostr key safe compares the options.

Do you support NIP-04 messages?

For reading, yes, so old history isn't lost. For sending, NIP-04 is opt-in only: messages default to NIP-44 encryption wrapped in NIP-17, so relays can't see who is talking to whom.

Which Bitcoin wallets does the air-gapped mode work with?

PSBT over animated QR (the UR standard). Validated round trip with Sparrow and BlueWallet on mainnet: real transactions, real broadcast, single-sig and multisig. Anything that speaks standard PSBT over UR QR should work; those two are the ones we've driven end to end. Multisig wallets can also be imported in the formats Sparrow, Keystone and Coldcard use.

Supported: native SegWit single-sig (BIP-84), P2WSH multisig (BIP-48), BIP-137 message signing. Not supported: Taproot, BBQr.

Does it use Bluetooth?

Yes, with the Vault, which is in the firmware and being tested now, and only when you turn it on: the Vault door can use Bluetooth to reach the Favilla iPhone app or to type a login as a keyboard, and the Nostr door has a Bluetooth-only mode in which Wi-Fi never starts. Bluetooth only talks to an app you have paired with a six-digit code on the KEY. It is never started in the Bitcoin door, and Wi-Fi runs only in the Nostr door.

How is this different from the DIY signers, like the LNbits one?

Credit where due: the LNbits Nostr Signing Device and the DIY community started this category, and if you love flashing your own boards, they're great. We took a different bet, a finished product: a secure element and a separate vault processor instead of keys in plain flash, a machined enclosure, an app served from the device, encrypted messaging, a Bitcoin wallet, and hardware you can hand to someone who has never used a terminal.

What happens if Favilla disappears tomorrow?

Your KEY keeps working. The app is served from the hardware itself, with no app store or cloud. By default it publishes through a relay we run, and the remote app is hosted on this site; both can be replaced in Settings, and the default relay list already includes public relays. Air-gapped Bitcoin signing needs no network at all. Your bitcoin restores into any standard wallet, your Nostr key is portable, and the source will be public. We built it so you don't need us.

CIPHER

Is CIPHER actually mining Bitcoin?

No, and anyone telling you a pocket device can mine competitive bitcoin is selling something. CIPHER is a skill game themed on mining: you hunt hashes on the KEY, and difficulty climbs with your score. Your best runs are signed by your KEY so scores can't be faked, and top scores enter a weekly draw for real sats, funded by us as a prize pool. It's a game that pays out, not a miner. The full guide is here.

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